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COMMENT
LAW AND CULTURE IN CHINA AND JAPAN:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
John 0. Haley*
Each of the articles in this collection offers a separate perspective on
the relationship of law and culture as related to legal development and
reform in China or Japan or both. Each provides significant insights. Yet
none attempts to define either of the two concepts-law and culture-
central to each. In this respect they are not unusual. Seldom do studies of
law and development or legal reform attempt either to explore applicable
concepts of law or to state explicitly the definitional premises on which
their analyses are based. Such neglect is understandable where the focus
of the inquiry is a single legal order or tradition and definitional assump-
tions are commonly shared-as detailed below, a cultural
phenomenon-and can be left unstated. Comparative law analyses, par-
ticularly those that treat well-established legal traditions, do not enjoy
this privilege. To leave unstated basic assumptions regarding the objects
of observation can only obfuscate the issue and create more questions
than answers to the problems posed. The perennial disputes over the
meaning of "law" in China come to mind. l To ask whether a culturally-
bound, Eurocentric definition of law existed in China is almost as silly as
asking whether a Chinese emperor reigned in Rome. Thus, before at-
tempting to make any comments, I would like first to suggest a set of
definitions that will hopefully enable a fuller and clearer analysis of the
problems the articles in this symposium raise. Using this definitional
frame of reference, I will then propose an historical or evolutionary per-
spective that I believe aids in understanding East Asian legal orders,
especially the fundamental differences between China and Japan. This
Comment is thus divided into two parts. The first sets forth a series of
definitional propositions intended for a more general analysis of the in-
terrelationships of law and culture. The second comprises an
introduction to the evolution of legal institutions that enables us to un-
derstand better the reception and development of Western legal
institutions in East Asia and provides context for the four articles and
their individual and collective insights.
* Wiley B. Rutledge Professor of Law and Director, Whitney R. Harris Institute for
Global Legal Studies, Washington University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 181-88
(2002).
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I. DEFINING LAW AND CULTURE
With respect to definitions of "culture," I know of no better than the
one Cornell University Professor Robert Smith recommended to me
2many years ago. Speaking as an anthropologist, he said that culture
comprises the values, beliefs, habits, and expectations shared within a
community. Thus defined, culture can hardly be separated from law, and
attempts to do so must fail. Any presumed conundrums regarding their
interrelationships dissipate once their inseparability becomes apparent.
Most legal rules and principles in any society reflect generally-held val-
ues and beliefs, if only by virtue of their longevity and endurance.
Similarly, either by affirming preexisting habits and expectations or by
creating the conditions for change, existing processes for both lawmak-
ing and legal enforcement inexorably influence the continuity or change
of culture. Conceptions of law itself are also cultural phenomena. Legal
orders are belief systems in the sense that concepts of law are themselves
shared beliefs that generate shared habits and expectations. As elabo-
rated below, Western notions of natural law and private law exist as
components within a widely shared notional system. The institutions and
procedural processes that make them seem real as positive or "living"
law-and appear to set them apart from what "ought" to be-may be
treated analytically as "institutional," but the norms themselves and the
system of law in which they are conceived are grounded in widely
shared understandings and generally unstated presumptions. Political
legitimacy in particular is determined by shared values and beliefs. Thus,
as a prerequisite for governance without the imposition of a totalitarian
regime based on fear and the effective threat of brute force, legitimacy as
culture determines the efficacy of all legal orders.3
We too often fail to define culture with precision or to identify more
specifically its various aspects. For example, Japan's preeminent postwar
legal sociologist, Takeyoshi Kawashima, coining the phrase "legal con-
sciousness," argued that a culturally-based aversion to litigation as ashared value exceptionally inhibited litigation in Japan. He erred. As I
2. Smith suggested the definition during a research workshop of contributors to THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN: CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DYNAMICS (Shunpei Kumon &
Henry Rosovsky eds., 1992). The meeting included a lively interchange among leading spe-
cialists on Japan from various social science disciplines on the meaning and role of culture in
Japan's political economy, much of which is memorialized in the published volume.
3. See generally DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER (1991).
4. See KAWASHIMA TAKEYOSHI, NIHONJIN No H6 ISHIKI [JAPANESE LEGAL CON-
SCIOUSNESS] (1967); Kawashima Takeyoshi, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in




countered5 nearly three decades ago, Kawashima presented no evidence
of a peculiarly Japanese aversion to litigation. Litigation for selfish gain
is condemned morally in nearly all societies. Nonetheless, litigation had
long been a central feature of Japanese governance, and, as Kawashima's
own data showed, litigation rates in prewar Japan were considerably
higher than in postwar Japan. Indeed, litigation rates did not reach pre-
war levels until over a decade after Kawashima's study.6 Had Kawashima
been more precise and narrowed his claim-had he identified, for exam-
ple, the shared opprobrium of physical handicaps and their public
display as one example of a disincentive to litigate-his argument would
have been persuasive. He also would have been quite correct to attribute
this disincentive to culture. We now have substantial evidence that poten-
tial Japanese litigants avoid lawsuits, even when litigated outcomes will
likely yield greater gains than final private settlements, in situations
where a public trial might require the exposure of physical disfigurement
and inflict a sense of "shame" on those in defiance of a widely accepted
societal norm.7 Thanks to Kawashima's gifted prot6g6, Kahei Rokumoto,
we have empirical evidence that lawsuits for compensation for personal
injury constitute the only category of tort litigation where survey data
show Japanese claimants settling for less gain than they anticipate from
litigating and prosecuting their case to judgment.'
By the same token, economic and institutional disincentives are
equally compelling explanations for both fluctuations in Japanese litiga-
tion rates over time and lower rates relative to the United States. The
sudden increase in shareholder derivative suits almost immediately after
a reduction in filing fees in the early 1990s, noted by Mark West among
others,9 illustrates the importance of what I view as institutional barriers
to litigation.'0 In turn, Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato's study of
insurance settlements and court awards in automobile accident litiga-
tion" amply supports the assertion that the lack of a civil jury system and
greater certainty in the outcome of litigation in Japan fosters settlements
5. John 0. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPAN. STUD. 359 (1978).
6. See John 0. Haley, Litigation in Japan: A New Look at Old Problems, 10 WIL-
LAMETrE J. INT'L L. & DisP. RESOL. 121, 123-26 (2002).
7. See Haley, supra note 5, at 367.
8. Rokumoto Kahei, Higaisha-gawa tejisha no hrkrd6 [Legal Process From the Per-
spective of Victims as Parties], in JID SHA JIKO MEGURU FUNS SHORI TO H [LAW AND
RESOLUTION OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT DISPUTES] 33 (Kawashima Takeyoshi & Hirano
Ryuichi eds., 1978).
9. Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 351, 353 (2001); Zenichi Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law and Corporate
Governance: Current Changes in Historical Perspective, 49 AM. J. CoMiIP. L. 653, 674 (2001).
10. See Haley, supra note 5, at 378-89.
11. J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts
and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1989).
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and thus helps to explain an apparent dearth of lawsuits relative to the
United States.'2 Culture, defined and delineated with some precision, is
thus neither all-explaining nor a residual "black box" to be ignored
unless all other explanations for social behavior fail. Culture may also
reflect, I should add, rational choices over time.
We also tend to neglect the mutability of culture. Economic, social,
and political change inexorably produces cultural change. New patterns
of daily life produce changed habits and expectations. Novel ways of
dealing with old and new problems create new ideas that often challenge
and eventually upend long-held shared values and beliefs. Institutional
and cultural changes thus go hand in glove. From an historical perspec-
tive, the dynamic interplay of both produces an evolutionary-but not
linear-progression in governance and law. For example, as economic
and social incentives to sue increase and socially accepted-i.e., cultur-
ally determined--disincentives decrease, or justifications increase, or
both, cultural impediments to litigation should dissipate. Unfortunately,
no one to my knowledge has followed Kahei Rokumoto's lead and ex-
amined the propensity over time of Japanese plaintiffs with personal
injury claims to settle for less than they anticipate receiving through a
litigated outcome.
Studies of the reception of Western legal institutions in East Asia, as• 13
I have suggested previously, usefully begin with a definition of law as
well as culture. With respect to law, I posit a view that identifies ele-
ments and processes that appear common to all developed legal orders
and established traditions. The basic elements are twofold. The first ele-
ment comprises the rules and principles or the norms of law. The second
element includes the sanctions of law. Connected to both are institutional
legal processes for the recognition of legal norms (lawmaking) and their
enforcement (law enforcing). Each process involves an exercise of po-
litical authority or power (or both) and thus requires some sort of
political rule or governance comprising actors and institutions. Without
such institutions, widely shared norms-infractions of which incur some
form of social disapproval-may function and be defined as "law,"'' 4 but
for comparative purposes, at least, such norms are more properly treated
as "custom," as described below.
All political orders have identifiable legal norms generally intended
to channel or control individual and collective behavior. It is axiomatic
12. See Haley, supra note 5, at 364, 366.
13. See JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE
PARADOX 5-18 (1991).
14. See, e.g., E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 18-28 (1954).




that most of these orders establish norms designed to protect vested in-
terests, especially the interests of those who rule and make the norms.1
Most have rules to deter unwanted disruptions of social and political or-
der, such as the proscription of unauthorized violence, and all have rules
that regulate wealth, its creation, and its allocation to those who rule. In
democratic societies in which political authority responds to majoritarian
values and needs, legal rules tend to reflect and reinforce those interests.
In those societies where political authority is concentrated, the rules tend
to favor the interests and values of the few who govern. In societies in
which political authority rests on broader bases of community consen-
sus, the legal norms generally reflect broader, more widely shared
community interests and values. Therefore, determining who controls
norm creating or lawmaking processes illuminates the configurations of
political authority and influence within a society. Conversely, prevailing
legal norms are themselves equally revealing with respect to who gov-
erns.
Sanctions and law enforcement constitute my second cluster of ele-
ment and process. Sanctions may be authorized by lawmakers, but they
are applied or imposed through one or more formal and official proc-
esses for enforcing legal norms. Learning which sanctions are imposed,
how severe and how effective they are in channeling conforming behav-
ior, by which processes they are imposed, and who controls their
application is telling with respect to the nature of the political and legal
orders in which they are applied. Lawmakers, and those who control the
law-enforcing processes, generally reserve the most severe sanctions for
threats to legal norms they consider most important, particularly those
that allocate wealth and suppress threats to the authority and power of
those who govern. Indeed, few if any political orders tolerate and leave
unpunished effective threats to existing political arrangements-whether
democratic or autocratic.
As suggested above, we need to differentiate legal norms (rules and
principles) and their related processes for sanctions, lawmaking, and en-
forcement from customary and nonlegal institutional norms and their
processes. Lawmaking and legal enforcement differ from similar or even
otherwise identical nonlegal institutional norms and processes in two
critical respects. The first precondition of law, as noted, is that it
15. The example provided by Feldman of the Japanese Ministry of Finance's interest in
tobacco-related legislation comes readily to mind. The Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corpo-
ration, established in 1904 as a public monopoly to control the cultivation, manufacture, and
sale of tobacco products, was, until 1984, a public corporation managed as an agency of the
Ministry. In 1984 the corporation was privatized and renamed Japan Tobacco, but with two-
thirds of its stock owned by the Ministry. See Eric A. Feldman, The Landscape of Japanese
Tobacco Policy: Law, Smoking and Social Change, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 679 (2001).
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emanates from political authority. The second is that its validity as law
depends on what H.L.A. Hart refers to as the secondary rules of law--or
the rules of recognition-in any given system. 6 Hence, a dress code may
be purely conventional or customary, with infractions punished through
some form of social disapproval. If so, its validity and endurance de-
pends solely on its power to conform social behavior. Change occurs
through nonconformity followed by increased imitation. Institutionalized
rules may still not be considered legal by virtue of particular rules of
recognition, as in the case of the formal rules of private versus public
schools.
An unstated assumption is that those who make law also control law
enforcement. This is not necessarily true. Lawmaking and law enforcing
are closely related, but they are also distinct and, at least with respect to
lawmaking, independent processes. It may be useful at this juncture to
define and distinguish what I refer to as "public" versus "private" law-
enforcing processes. Both, in turn, must be differentiated from custom-
ary enforcement. The notions are simple. A public law enforcement
process is one controlled by those who govern and their agents. The cap-
ture, condemnation, and punishment of a village thief by the ruling
elders exemplify a rudimentary process of public law enforcement in the
legal order of an equally rudimentary political system. We can more
readily identify the actors, institutions, and procedures of our administra-
tive regulation and criminal justice systems that constitute the public law
enforcement processes of the modern state. By private law enforcement,
I mean simply the process for enforcing private law-a formal, official
process that, as explained in detail below, we generally take for
granted-enabling, or to be more accurate, empowering private parties
(those who are governed subjects or citizens) to enforce legal rules. In
contrast to both public and private law enforcement processes, custom-
ary enforcement processes do not involve political authority. A process
like the sanction is unofficial, informal, and communitarian. Ordinarily,
it presupposes collective or community action-various forms of social
disapproval or, to use John Braithwaite's often misunderstood label,
"shaming."' 7 Thus, custom rarely remains viable when challenged by
interest-enhancing, nonconforming behavior unless community consen-
sus deems the violation offensive and regularly meets it with some form
of social disapproval. Without such sanction, customary norms readily
change through nonconformity and increasing imitation. Community
16. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77 (1961).
17. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 100 (1989); see also
HOEBEL, supra note 14.
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Law and Culture
disapproval inhibits both. The consequence is that the community, not
those who rule, determines the continued viability of customary norms.
Charles Whitehead's account of network norms and sanctions with
respect to the 1988 Basel Accord on capital measurement and capital
standards for banks is a near perfect example of customary norm crea-
tion and enforcement within a rudimentary political order. The processes
he describes have more in common with the "law of primitive man," to
borrow Adamson Hoebel's title, 8 and early feudal processes in Western
Europe and-as described below-Japan than lawmaking or enforce-
ment within any of the states involved. Both the norms and their efficacy,
as Whitehead argues, depend upon consent and consensus among the
states with the greatest economic and political leverage. As in customary
orders, the creation of any new norm requires negotiated assent among
all but dependent or subordinated actors. Compliance, too, requires
broad acceptance or the effective threat of "shaming" in one or more of
its various forms. The international legal order is largely one of authority
without power, and the consequence is informality and consensual gov-
ernance. Feldman's account of the realization of an international norm
within Japan details the other side of the story. His scenario also has
Japanese officials at an international conference, in this instance agree-
ing under extreme international and domestic NGO and media pressure
to sign the World Health Organization's Framework on Tobacco Control.
As discussed below, it is a story that well illustrates the processes of
consensual governance in Japan.
Why do the distinctions among public, private, and customary proc-
esses for law enforcement matter? The answer lies first, as noted, in
management and control. As defined, the mechanisms for law enforce-
ment differ essentially in who manages and controls them. In all public
law enforcement processes, government officials determine whether and
which legal rules to enforce. In the simplest political orders, the rulers
themselves may exercise this discretion; in the most complex, agents of
the state, administrative officials, the police, and prosecutors have this
choice. The appropriateness of the choices they make may become is-
sues of control between the governing principals and their prosecutorial
agents, but their subjects, those who are governed, do not get to choose.
Private parties-the victims of a crime or of some administrative infrac-
tion-may file complaints and thereby have some voice in initiating the
enforcement process, but their voice diminishes thereafter. They may
petition or plead, but they do not determine whether to proceed with or
18. HOEBEL, supra note 14. For a similar but far more extensively elaborated perception
that international law resembles law in primitive societies, see MICHAEL BARKUN, LAW
WITHOUT SANCTIONS: ORDER IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1968).
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stop enforcement. They cannot end the process by withdrawing their
complaint or reaching a settlement with the offender. The bargains
reached with those accused of violating applicable rules are negotiated
between public officials and the miscreants, not the victims, who are af-
fected most by the infraction of the legal norm. Universally justified in
terms of "public interest"-the rhetorical rubric for the policy prefer-
ences of those who rule or seek influence-public law enforcement by
definition lodges prosecutorial discretion and control in the hands of
those who exercise political authority and power.
Private law enforcement, in contrast, describes any means of formal,
state-sponsored law enforcement subject to the control of private par-
ties-in other words, the subjects of political authority.'9 Private law
enforcement thus usually represents either a willingness by rulers to give
up control or a recognition of their inability to control, at least fully, the
process of law enforcement. Needless to say, this is a pivotal notion in
any analysis of the evolution of political institutions.
The processes of both public and private law enforcement are formal
and official. They involve a resort to established state institutions and
state actors. The difference is in who exercises prosecutorial discretion
and control. Private law enforcement limits the role of those who rule-
the state and state actors-with one pivotal exception: judges. Those
who rule and their agents thus do not control the private enforcement
process. Even judges in purely private law enforcement do not initiate or
control private enforcement. They may determine and permit the sanc-
tion, but they do not, for the most part, supervise its actual application.
Law enforcement processes inexorably serve dual purposes. To the
extent that law enforcement or its threat affects behavior, those who con-
trol enforcement control the efficacy of the legal rule. Not all legal rules
are ever formally enforced, and one can imagine a political order in
which all legal rules are left to informal means of enforcement, with the
consequences detailed above. The legal enforcement of norms, whatever
their source, also involves their formal and official recognition and thus
an independent phase in their "making" as law. Thus, whether intended
or not, through the articulation and enforcement of particular norms as
either rules or standards, adjudicatory or "judicial" processes conducted
by those who rule are, or necessarily become, lawmaking processes in
which judges have a decisive voice.
19. Eric Feldman describes an example of an embryonic private enforcement system
that has all but one of the critical characteristics in Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and
Norms in the World's Premier Fish Market, 94 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). The only
feature it lacks is state enforcement. Compliance with the decisions of the adjudicator is vol-
untary, based on a sense of mutual self-interest of repeat players. It thus has much in common
with adjudication in early feudal orders, noted below.
[Vol. 27:895
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A system of private law enforcement necessitates some means of de-
termining who exercises control over the enforcement of legal rules.
Whatever the language, whatever the terminology, some conception of
"rights" as claims to enforcement and "duties" to be enforced must be
devised. Expressed in the maxim ubi ius ibi remedium, the conception of
a system of "rights" that entitle their holders to a state-enforced remedy
was, in my view, Roman law's grandest achievement and one of its most
important legacies. Hohfeld's seminal conclusion that in private law all
rights have correlative duties' ° lies at the heart of Roman law and, by
reception, Western law.
To enable private law enforcement, some form of adjudication is
also necessary. A politically and legally authorized third-party adjudica-
tor must make the required findings of fact and law in order to determine
who is entitled to enforcement as a holder of the rights at issue, whether
the claim has been properly lodged against the defending party as the
bearer of the duty, and whether the duty has been breached. Adjudication
is thus, I posit, a shared feature of all private law enforcement processes.
Lawmaking and law-enforcing processes also tend to differ with re-
spect to the underlying conditions for their effectiveness. Both require
actors and institutions, but lawmaking also needs the legitimacy or the
authority of the relevant legal norms or those who make them--or, better
yet, both. Effective law enforcing requires both authority and power, le-
gitimacy as well as the capacity to coerce. Effective authority
(legitimacy) with or without power and effective power with or without
authority are both possible. Authority and power become mutually nec-
essary only with respect to the effectiveness of adjudicatory (judicial)
21
lawmaking, where compliance is not based on voluntary assent. We can
imagine, for example, a relatively simple political order based on kin-
ship, ruled by a small group of household heads by custom and
convention-by definition, authoritative, legitimate norms-and led by
the eldest member. To the extent they wish to change customary or con-
ventional rules regarding succession to the household headship or the
designation of the eldest as leader, members of this order face problems
of authority and power. First, the ruling household heads must have suf-
ficient political authority to make a new norm-that is, for the
community to accept the new norm as legitimate, it must also accept the
lawmaking authority of those who made it. Such community consensus
eliminates the need for any mechanism for enforcing the new rule. By
definition, community acceptance of the rule's legitimacy-which might
20. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
21. See the example of the Tuna Court. Feldman, supra note 19.
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best be called "derivative legitimacy"-produces compliance. It thus
will function like any other customary rule dependent upon community
acceptance and conformity. If a member of the community effectively
challenges the legitimacy of the new rule, however, its formal enforce-
ment becomes necessary. To the extent the rulers can coerce compliance,
they may be able to effect the change. But unless and until the commu-
nity accepts the legitimacy of the new rule, those who rule will continue
to need the capacity to coerce compliance. In such an event, our simple
hypothetical polity risks transformation from one of authority without
power to one of power without authority.
Finally, rulers do not readily give up control. This was as true for the
Romans as it is for state actors today. Private law in Roman times was
not the central feature of Roman rule. Although it became Rome's most
significant conceptual legacy, it was, and presumably remained, periph-
eral to Roman rule. The Twelve Tables from which the classical
conceptions of private law developed were themselves a set of rules the
patrician rulers of the city of Rome formulated as a result of the de-
mands of plebeians seeking political recognition and influence in the
fifth century BCE. In Alan Watson's words, "The plebeians had de-
manded that the law should apply to all. What they got was a code that
was egalitarian in appearance because the patricians, legislating de haut
en bas, inserted into it only rules and institutions they were willing to
share with the plebeians."23 Notably absent in the Twelve Tables are the
most meaningful rules related to governance, including rules concerning
control over resources and revenues (a paramount issue for any rulers),
and those related to economic, social, or political behavior. Such rules-
if one may call them rules at all-apparently remained unwritten and
under patrician control. Thus, the separation of public and private law,
or, as Watson put it, "the public dimension" of private law, became one
24of Roman law's notable characteristics.
II. JAPAN AND CHINA FROM AN HISTORICAL (EVOLUTIONARY)
PERSPECTIVE
Just as political and social systems can be described and understood
in historical-that is, evolutionary-terms, so too can law and its corre-
sponding legal processes evolve. They do so, however, in tandem with
the political regimes on which they depend. However law may be de-
fined, the institutions that make and enforce law are instrumentalities of
22. HALEY, supra note 13, at 6.
23. ALAN WATSON, THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN LAW 55 (1995).
24. Id. at 49.
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those who rule. At some point and at some level, therefore, legal systems
reflect the systems of governance within which they function.
The spectrum of political development commences with the simplest
forms of political community. Communities defined by social ties of kin-
ship and held together by mutual dependency and the need for
cooperative endeavor come to mind. In such societies, political and so-
cial authority tends to be undifferentiated, rudimentary, and relatively
weak. Family hierarchy and accepted claims to religious authority are
the common sources of authority. Custom and customary processes pre-
vail, and law as related to institutional processes seldom exists.
Similarly, the capacity for coercion depends on collective, community
action." At the other end of the evolutionary spectrum are the most po-
litically, economically, and socially advanced societies. They are
characterized by complex organizational features and ordering arrange-
ments. They have well-established hierarchical systems of governance
with centralized institutions featuring specialized actors as agents of the
state and elaborate bureaucracies for making and enforcing legal rules.26
Those who rule may differ in the legitimacy of their authority and their
capacity to coerce, but all are able to make and enforce new rules of law.
The legal rules of this system tend to be proscriptive-generally ex-
pressed as administrative orders or crimes-and enforced through one or
more public law processes. At the very least, those who govern entrust
control over the enforcement of the legal rules they consider significant
to one or more official, public agencies. In contemporary criminal law in
the United States and Japan, prosecutors exercise this control." Although
some might think of the advanced industrial states of Western Europe as
the prototype of this system, the great bureaucratic empires of Czarist
Russia, the Ottomans, and the imperial Chinese outdistanced the West in
terms of governance and control by several centuries." In fact, the first
25. See, e.g., HOEBEL, supra note 14. See also Richard Schwartz, Social Factors in the
Development of Legal Control, 63 YALE L.J. 471 (1954).
26. See, e.g., S.N. EISENSTADT, THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF EMPIRES 15-17 (1963).
27. The restriction of prosecutorial discretion expressed by the Legalitatsprinzip in
German law is a notable exception. Not coincidentally, the German system of mandatory
prosecution was not influenced by Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861), Germany's pre-
eminent nineteenth century Roman private law scholar. By restricting prosecutorial discretion,
German criminal law became a system that paralleled private law, in that it ensured what were
in effect legally enforceable claims, or "rights" to enforcement by crime victims. See
Promemoria der Justizninister Savigny und Uhden ulber die Einfiihrung der Staats-
Anwaltschaft [Memorial of Justice Minister Savigny and Uden on the Establishment of State
Prosecution in Criminal Procedure], in 11 PREUSSISCHE GESETZREVISION, 1825-1848 [PRus-
SIAN LEGISLATIVE REFORMS, 1825-1848] 1284 (Werner Schubert & JUrgen Regge eds., 1981).
28. The ancient bureaucratic empires of Egypt, Rome, and the Byzantines could be
added to the list. See EISENSTADT, supra note 26; see also the various studies in THE DECLINE
OF EMPIRES (S.N. Eisenstadt ed., 1967).
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enduring political system to reach this endpoint of the evolutionary tra-
jectory was China.
By the third century BCE, imperial Chinese rulers had established a
system of centralized hierarchical governance that represented in evolu-
tionary terms the most advanced administrative order on the globe. It
was an exemplary public law system,'9 reflecting, as Douglass North
observed with respect to ancient bureaucratic empires of the Mediterra-
nean, "the persistent tension between rulers attempting to maximize their
revenues and control over their constituents and agents whose interests
seldom completely coincided with those of the ruler."3°
Yet China lacked the two features of law that distinguish the concep-
tions of law as developed in Western Europe. One feature was private
law. The second was the inclusion within the Western European legal
system of the notion of natural law-a cultural conception of an order of
law which deems certain controlling norms universal, timeless, hierar-
chically superior, and thus binding with respect to all other legal rules.3
In no other legal tradition, to my knowledge, did either a system of pri-
vate or natural law develop. To be sure, the great legal traditions of East
and South Asia both recognized and enforced private agreements and
proprietorship claims, but they did so within a conceptual and institu-
tional framework that gave claimants only limited voice. The dynastic
codes of imperial China, as well as laws in the Hindu-Buddhist tradition
of South Asia-the other enduring legal tradition of an "Axial civiliza-
tion" outside of Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean-included
recognition and enforcement of what we now consider private law rules,
such as those concerning the failure to pay debts or the appropriation of
goods left on deposit.33 But both imperial Chinese law and the dharma or
"laws" of Manu deemed these actions minor penal offenses not requir-
29. See THOMAS A. METZGER, THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF CH'ING BUREAUC-
RACY: LEGAL, NORMATIVE, AND COMMUNICATION ASPECTS (1973); R. Kent Guy, Rule of Man
and Rule of Law in China: Punishing Provincial Governors during the Qing, in THE LIMITS
OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 88, 88-90 (Karen G. Turner, James V. Feinerman & R. Kent
Guy eds., 2000). Benjamin Schwartz describes the system as "unambiguously authoritarian,"
with state authority "totalitarian" in scope. Benjamin I. Schwartz, The Primacy of the Political
Order in East Asian Societies: Some Preliminary Generalizations, in FOUNDATIONS AND LIM-
ITS OF STATE POWER IN CHINA 1, 1-4 (Stuart Schram ed., 1987), cited and discussed in
HALEY, supra note 13, at 26-27.
30. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 119
(1981).
31. See 2 JOSEPH NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION IN CHINA 564 (1956).
32. See THE ORIGINS AND DIVERSITY OF AXIAL AGE CIVILIZATIONS (S.N. Eisenstadt
ed., 1986).
33. See INDIAN HISTORY SOURCEBOOK: THE LAWS OF MANU, C. 1500 BCE ch. VIII,
secs. 3-7 (George Buhler trans., 1886), available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/india/
manu-full.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
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ing, at least in the Chinese system, official enforcement. Officials instead
served as adjudicator-mediators to assist the disputants in reaching a set-
tlement. As in the case of the Twelve Tables, the only disputes over
which claimants had any voice-essentially the right to withdraw their
complaint-in imperial China concerned matters deemed too petty for
magistrates to pursue with full vigor as a law enforcement matter. From
the perspective of those who governed at the center, these were indeed
"minor matters" they hoped the parties could resolve themselves peace-
fully without official intervention; if necessary, however, the services of
a magistrate as adjudicator-mediator were available.34 In short, these
were matters for dispute resolution, not law enforcement. As Philip
Huang concedes in his influential study of Qing civil law,35 the magis-
trate functioned more as mediator than adjudicator. Unless penal
sanctions were applied-thus making the dispute more than a "minor
matter"-relief ultimately required the mutual assent of all parties to the
proceedings.
Both imperial Chinese and Hindu-Buddhist law also drew on and
were immeasurably influenced by a shared belief in universally valid
moral orders. Neither the dharma themselves nor Confucian precepts
were conceived, however, as a set of rules or principles with intrinsic
force as law." Indian princes may have enforced the dharma just as the
dynastic codes of imperial China reflected and enforced Confucian
norms, but even the most basic Hindu-Buddhist or Confucian norms did
not function as legal principles-as norms with the force of law-until
articulated and enforced separately as legal rules. The Hindu-Buddhists
and Confucians conceived of a "natural" order within which prescribed
norms were universally and eternally valid-but as a separate moral, not
legal, order. They did not postulate an extant nexus of moral and legal
norms; their worlds of morality were separate from the world of law. In
contrast, the norms of "natural law," as conceived by Greek philoso-
phers, articulated in classical Roman law, redefined by Thomas Aquinas,
and understood in Western jurisprudence, today function conceptually
(culturally) as moral truths expressed as legal principles or rules in a hi-
erarchy in which they are effectively superior. In other words, because of
their notional nature, they either have the force of law or function as cri-
teria for "legality" and thereby trump all inferior or inconsistent-that is,
manmade-rules. One word, "justice," captures the nexus between moral
34. See, e.g., PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CIVIL JUSTICE IN CHINA: REPRESENTATION AND
PRACTICE IN THE QING 5-19, 76-137, 235 (1996).
35. Id. at 76-109, 122.
36. For a summary of assessments of the nature of the dharma as distinct from law, see
Rajeev Dhavan, Introduction, in MARC GALANTER, LAW AND SOCIETY IN MODERN INDIA Xiv-
xvii (1989).
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rules and legal rules in Western legal thought, which deems an otherwise
valid legal rule invalid or lacking "legality" if it is "unjust" in terms of a
natural law norm. Thus, in the West a notion of natural law "rights" en-
forceable against the state could develop.37 In this sense, there was no
"justice" in a Hindu-Buddhist kingdom or imperial China. Why these
characteristic features of Western law developed and endured uniquely in
the West remains a crucial question.
The significance of the exceptional development of both private and
natural law is not lost on those who argue that patterns of institutional
and cultural history continue to shape the course of present institutional
development and thus profoundly, if not determinatively, influence the
future directions of a society.38 How or why conceptions of private and
natural law developed and persisted over time should be especially sig-
nificant for those, like Professor Tanase, who accept the influence of
evolving institutional and cultural patterns within a society-"path de-
pendency," in the words of Douglass North. 3 Do these conceptions
endure as beliefs? If so, why? What economic, social, and political con-
ditions influence their retention or atrophy?
The primary source of private law in the West was classical Roman
private law, as received in Western Europe through the Corpus Juris
Civilis beginning in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The Corpus Juris
Civilis was itself a sixth century compilation of the precepts of classical
Roman civil law, whose significance relative to the evolution of public
law in its jurisdiction appears totally ignored. We know little and pre-
sumably care less about Roman administrative or criminal law, either at
its formation or in its classical period when it applied in the Eastern Em-
pire (now commonly known as the Byzantine Empire). ° The primacy of
private law in Western Europe was thus based on an historical stream of
political choices made in the late Middle Ages during the formative pe-
riod of the contemporary European state. It was the product of early
European statecraft, which reflected a mix of widely shared beliefs and
values, as well as economic, social, and political needs. By the nine-
teenth century, the conceptual system of private law derived from late
Roman sources had become firmly embedded in Western European insti-
tutional reality and legal culture as private and public law. Legal rules
37. See, e.g., RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVEL-
OPMENT (1979).
38. See, e.g., NORTH, supra note 30.
39. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 92-104 (1990).
40. Manlio Bellomo asserts that the Corpus Juris Civilis was superceded and "never"
functioned as a source of "living" law in the Eastern Empire. MANLIO BELLOMO, THE COM-
MON LEGAL PAST OF EUROPE, 1000-1800 39 (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 1995).
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expressed in terms of rights and duties enforced through an adjudicatory
process had become the constituent core of what was meant by "law."
We hardly know or care how the East defined law, particularly in the
developing bureaucratic systems of the Russian and Ottoman Empires
(the latter of which occupied lands of the Eastern Roman Empire, where
scholars once taught the Corpus Juris Civilis as if living law).
The states that emerged in Western Europe during the nineteenth
century were not prototypical advanced political orders. Western Europe
remained fragmented, with multiple states, diffuse sources of wealth,
and various constraints on state control. All states, however, had well-
developed private law systems. Indeed, from a nineteenth century per-
spective, the heart and soul of European legal systems were private law
rules set out in civil codes and enforced through lawsuits. The concep-
tual separation of public from private law began during the nineteenth
century, with France taking the lead and Germany following, although
state control through administrative regulation and criminal proscription
did not truly supplant the primacy of private law in the West until later in
the twentieth century. Prior to these events, most institutionally advanced
European industrial states, as well as the United States, had not estab-
lished as pervasive a merit-based state bureaucracy or regulatory system
as that of imperial China. By the last half of the twentieth century, par-
ticularly in the United States, the functional distinction between private
and public law became increasingly untenable as the expanding public
law dimension of private law made it an integral component of state con-
trol.
Adjudication necessitates judges and other specialized actors. It also
empowers judges as lawmakers and enforcers, as well as actors who par-
ticipate and influence the process. The centrality of adjudication in the
English system since the twelfth century explains why Montesquieu
could discover in England the judiciary as a separate branch of govern-
ment. As evolved within common law jurisdictions, the role of the
judiciary became an essential fixture of the liberal state, taking the "rule
of law" rather than "rule by law" as its hallmark. The paradox of this
vision is that it presupposes a state institution with the capacity to con-
trol the state. Two seemingly contradictory conditions for the judiciary
become essential: political autonomy from direction or interference by
any of the political branches of government and the capability as a state
institution to compel compliance from all who are subject to its com-
mands. These conditions also apply to other state institutions that direct
and exercise the coercive capacity of the state. To date, no state has fully
resolved this paradox.
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The conceptual and institutional features of Western European law,
with its distinctive blend of private and natural law and independent ju-
diciaries, became notionally indispensable components of any
"civilized" or "modem" legal system by the mid-nineteenth century. Al-
though private law rights had yielded their place in natural law theory to
rights against the state, the argument persists that Eurocentric visions
represent the "civilized" and "modem." As insightful a comparative legal
scholar as Marc Galanter described the elements of "modem" law41 for a
1966 Voice of America Forum Lecture Series, listing eleven features.
The first three related to legal rules: in "modem" legal systems, he as-
serted, legal rules are applied uniformly within a given territory. They
are expressed as rights and duties resulting from and applied to transac-
tions. They are deemed to have universal rather than particularistic
application and are thereby applied predictably. The remaining eight fac-
tors related to the institutional system in which legal rules are made and
enforced. As defined by Galanter, modem legal systems are hierarchal,
organized bureaucratically, rational, administered by professionals, and
require legal specialists-lawyers. In such a system, legislation replaces
custom as legal rules become "amendable." Above all, the system is po-
litical-lawmaking and enforcing become a monopoly of the state.
Remove the two elements relating exclusively to a private law system-
transactional rules and the need for lawyers-and what remains are fea-
tures of any highly-developed public law system. All these features, it
should be emphasized, were fundamental elements of imperial Chinese
law for over a millennium. Galanter's list simply identifies features of
late nineteenth century Western law and legal systems. They are modem
only in the sense that Western states did not become full-fledged admin-
istrative bodies until the past century. Like Galanter, Kawashima also
absorbed a culturally prevailing notion of modemity heavily influenced
by Western sociologists, such as Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, who
took the European state for granted as the model of modernity within a
linear conception of evolutionary institutional progress.42 The articles by
Tanase and Peerenboom similarly assume an unstated definition of law
in which private law and the features of private law enforcement as de-
veloped in Western Europe remain paramount. Hence the debate
continues over the lack of law in China and the concern over litigation as
an essential aspect of a developed legal order.
All of this said, how do these notions help us to understand the prob-
lems of law and culture in East Asia and the problems of law reform in
41. Marc Galanter, The Modernization of Law, in MODERNIZATION: THE DYNAMICS OF
GROWTH 167 (Myron Weiner ed., 1966).
42. Kawashima, supra note 4.
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China and Japan? As I have long argued, the propositions detailed above
provide a framework that enables us to understand more fully the fun-
damental differences in the reception and development of Western law in
China and Japan. What matters in this story is that within the context of
comparable political arrangements and institutions, Japan too developed
an embryonic private law system. Japan was, in comparison to imperial
China, a primitive backwater on the periphery. Japan's institutional evo-
lution mirrored that of Western Europe in a remarkably simultaneous
paradigm of institutional arrangements between the twelfth and sixteenth
centuries, as fragmented warrior governance superseded, but did not
fully displace, centralized governance by sinofied elites. Unlike Europe,
however, Japan reached institutional equilibrium at the beginning of the
seventeenth century with the establishment of Tokugawa rule. This equi-
librium persisted until the Meiji Restoration in 1867. Moreover, unlike
Europe and China, the notion of universally applicable, transcendental
norms-whether conceived as natural law or a separate moral order-
did not take hold in Japan.43 Historically, Japanese culture did not in-
clude a shared belief in universal values nor a dichotomy between
"good" and "evil."44
Nonetheless, Tokugawa Japan provides a telling example of the de-
velopment through adjudication of rules and practices that constitute
private law in all but name. Tokugawa edicts recognized two types of
adjudication-one labeled "inquisitorial," the other "adversarial" (in
translation)--differentiated by the subject matter of the complaint and
the extent to which the matter in dispute related to the interests of the
Tokugawa overlords.45 Japanese adjudicatory procedure further differen-
tiated "adversarial" suits into four categories: those related to land and
water (ronsho), "main suits" (honkuji), "money suits" (kanekuji), and
mutual affairs (nakama-goto).46 Unquestionably influenced by imperial
Chinese law, these classifications and their differential treatment re-
flected a similar decision to allow official discretion and claimant voice
in cases involving matters deemed insignificant to the interests of the
rulers. As in China, ruling authorities considered the outcome of disputes
left to the initiative of claimants of so little concern that they could and
indeed should be settled quickly, preferably by some mutually acceptable
43. See, e.g., K. VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER 9 (1989).
44. See, e.g., John C. Pelzel, Human Nature in the Japanese Myths, in JAPANESE CUL-
TURE AND BEHAVIOR 3, 15-25 (Takie S. Lebra & William P. Lebra eds., 1974); TAKIE
SUGIYAMA LEBRA, JAPANESE PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR 11-14 (1976).
45. See 1 DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW 99-125 (1965);
Yoshiro Hiramatsu, Tokugawa Law, 14 LAW IN JAPAN, 1981, at 1, 27 (Dan Fenno Henderson
trans.).
46. HENDERSON, supra note 45, at 102; Hiramatsu, supra note 45, at 34.
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compromise. Unlike China, it appears, these suits, particularly commer-
cial "money" suits, became increasingly common fare. And with the
frequency of like claims, a system of precedents developed. In the words
of John H. Wigmore: "From the 1600's onward, the highly organized
judiciary system began to develop by judicial precedent a body of native
law and practice, which can only be compared with the English inde-
pendent development after the 1400'S.,, 47 This presumably enabled
Japanese, like English claimants, to rely on prior judicial decisions in
similar cases and begin operating in the "shadow of the law." The conse-
quent reduction in transaction costs, as well as risks associated with
credit transactions, undoubtedly benefited commerce. With respect to the
legal system, Japan would later prove able to import verbatim transla-
tions of German and other Western private law rules with alacrity, as
many resembled preexisting practices with startling coincidence.48
By the end of the nineteenth century in Japan, the Meiji state had
successfully adapted Western law and legal institutions to achieve unifi-
cation and the establishment of stable state authority in what was, and
remains, a relatively weak state. The age-old tensions of state power re-
mained as government institutions expanded, reinforced their authority,
and attempted to increase their capacity to coerce. Japan's recent re-
forms, noted by Tanase as well as the case study of tobacco policy, must
therefore be viewed in the context of these tensions and the continuous
efforts for reform and institutional change that are themselves significant
features of Japanese continuity. This context includes another notable
feature of continuity: Japan's highly competitive, closely knit communi-
ties-public and private-that constantly seek ways to maintain their
autonomy from external control. Learning from abroad is an equally per-
sistent and related aspect of the Japanese experience, less a process of
conformity, as Feldman suggests, than the combination of two closely
related factors-both cultural reflections of shared habits and values.
The first is an internally motivated, highly competitive, and quite rational
utilitarian quest for new and better models by the state and the communi-
ties that compete within it.49 The second is the prevailing communitarian
orientation of a society that lacks a sense of transcendental values.50
Membership in an elite international community, like the village or the
47. 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 504
(1928). Wigmore taught Anglo-American law in Japan from 1889 to 1992. His multivolume
compilation of materials on Tokugawa law and practice remains unsurpassed as an historical
resource.
48. See Mark D. West, Losers: Recovering Lost Property in Japan and the United
States, 37 L. & Soc'Y REV. 369 (2003).
49. See JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 9-12 (1998).
50. Id. at 4-9, 13-19.
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firm, requires subordination of individual self-interest and conformity to
community norms.
Feldman's study illustrates the process of social change through con-
sensus. The critical element is not conformity, however, but the agents of
change-individuals acting within or as communities. He identifies most
of the players: state actors, principally the Ministry of Finance (MoF)
and Japan Tobacco, the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
(MHLW), and concerned politicians; tobacco growers, retailers, and oth-
ers with economic and commercial interests at stake; the media,
organized groups of non-smokers, and their lawyers; and the courts. He
describes a quarter-century long process of persuasion that ultimately
changed attitudes and habits and produced an abrupt legal change. The
enactment between 2000 and 2003 of a series of local ordinances and
national legislation regulating tobacco use and, not coincidentally given
MoF influence and interests, increasing the tobacco tax represented the
final stage of a process of consent and consensus that featured a variety
of persuasive means. Feldman stresses the increasing general awareness
by Japanese, especially those who traveled abroad for business or as
tourists, students, or otherwise, of changing U.S. attitudes and law, as
well as international pressures (gaiatsu). A closer look, however, reveals
a process that may have begun with changing worldwide attitudes but
that unfolded in Japan in ways that exemplified the complex process of
consensual governance.
As Feldman explains here and in a previously published work,51 this
process began in the late 1970s with the first political response to non-
smoker concerns over unwanted exposure to tobacco smoke. These early
political efforts coincided with the first lawsuits against, among others,
the government and the Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation (Ja-
pan Tobacco after 1984). The litigation continued unabated through the
1980s and 1990s. Insofar as the defendants routinely won, Feldman dis-
misses any meaningful role for courts in effecting the change. I disagree.
Although the plaintiffs may have lost all or nearly all of these suits, the
litigation itself produced change. For example, the Japan National Rail-
way and its privatized successors may have won every suit brought to
compel them to institute no smoking cars, yet while these cases were
still pending on appeal, or soon thereafter, the defendants decided with-
out court compulsion to reserve some cars on most "bullet" trains for
non-smokers. The litigants in effect focused national attention on a
grievance. Their persistence, along with other factors-neither the least
or most important of which was national media focus on international
community "shaming" of Japan and other purposeful uses of gaiatsu by
51. Feldman, supra note 15.
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domestic actors-helped to foster a consensus that effected political and
legal change.
Feldman's story should remind us that courts, unlike legislative cor-
ridors and administrative meeting rooms, provide an accessible and open
public forum, a place where those who seek legal change can voice
grievances not as petitions or pleas but as claims to "rights." The story of
lawsuits over tobacco policy, like that of suits concerning industrial pol-
lution and other social issues over the past half century, thus illustrates
the critical, albeit regrettably neglected, didactic role that litigation and
the courts play in nearly all legal systems with developed institutions for
private law enforcement. Feldman's narrative accurately excludes judges
as primary actors. By dismissing the plaintiffs' claims, they removed
themselves as the makers of new rules. Their refusal to recognize new
"rights" left to the political branches of government the determinative
voice in making new rules regarding tobacco use. The availability of ad-
judication as a private law enforcement process, however, empowered
litigants to influence public attitudes and catalyze public discussion and
concern, forming the new consensus that produced legislated change.
Other actors played key roles. Officials in MHLW acquired new influ-
ence in policy formation that enabled them as a matter of intra-agency
rivalry to challenge the predominant leverage of MoF So too did the re-
forms satisfy the needs of the Koizumi Cabinet as a government
committed to change. The increase in the tobacco tax looks very much
like part of the bureaucratic consensus that preserved MoF's interests
and concerns. Not until a broad social and political consensus emerges
should one expect judges to affirm a "sense of society" that justifies a
recognition of "rights" left unarticulated within general principles or leg-
52islated rules.
Measured by almost any standard of well-being, the Japanese story
is one of success. Japan today has one of the highest standards of living
on the globe. The Japanese people enjoy a per capita income, a life ex-
pectancy, a literacy rate, a crime rate, and an even distribution of wealth
that surpass all but a few small European states." More to the point, only
52. See Haley, supra note 49, at 122, 176.
53. Despite a population that is one-third larger than Germany's and twice as large as
France's and the United Kingdom's, Japan's per capita GDP, at $28,000 in 2003, is higher
than any European state other than Luxembourg ($55,100), Norway ($37,700), Switzerland
($32,800), Denmark ($31,200), Austria ($30,000), and Belgium ($29,000). It is higher than
the United Kingdom ($27,700), Germany ($27,600), France ($27,500), Italy ($26,800), and
Sweden ($26,800). See http://www.worldfactsandfigures.com/gdp-countrydesc.php (last
visited Apr. 5, 2006). Life expectancy for both men and women in Japan is one of the highest
in the world, as is its literacy rate. See http://www.worldfactsandfigures.com (last visited Apr.
5, 2006). Japan's crime rates are by far the lowest in the industrialized world. The most recent
United Nations statistics show that as of 1997 Japan has six times fewer reported crimes than
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two other Asian states are replicating its success-Taiwan and South
Korea, both former colonies in which Japan introduced Western law at
the same historical moment as its own legal reform. 54
China remains a strong state. Anyone who doubts this assertion, at
least relative to Japan, should compare the Chinese state's ability to build
the world's largest dam on the Yangtze River to Japan's extraordinary
incapacity to construct a new runway for its premier international airport
at Narita.55 Yet, as Tanase and Peerenboom examine from different per-
spectives, China faces a formidable challenge. To adopt the essential
features of Western law, those who govern China must first be willing to
relinquish control. They must allow a system of private law and effective
private law enforcement to develop. They must subject themselves to
legal rules restricting their freedom of political choice and transfer con-
trol over the enforcement of these rules to an autonomous state
institution staffed by officials operating independently of their direction.
This requires government officials to purposefully abandon beliefs, val-
ues, expectations, and habits that have endured in China for over a
millennium. In other words, they must abandon culture as well as self-
interest.
The alternative is, as Peerenboom suggests, reforms imposed from
below. This requires the development of a civil society with a political
voice, and the most seasoned institutional historians offer few encourag-
ing words on this prospect.-6 Perhaps, as in Taiwan and South Korea,
economic growth will produce such voices from below, but no historical
examples-including China itself-yet exist of such an internally gener-
ated transformation occurring within a highly developed state without a
well-established private law system.
Sweden and more than ten times fewer incidents than Denmark, the two lowest rates reported
in Europe. Internationally, only Hong Kong equals Japan's per capita rate of reported crime.
See http://www.unicri.it/wwd/analysis/icvs/data.php (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). Measured by
the Gini Index, Japan ranks just behind Denmark but just ahead of Norway, Finland, and Swe-
den in terms of the equality of distribution of household income. These five states have the
most evenly distributed household incomes of any industrial states. Inequality in Income or
Consumption, at http://hdr.undp.orglreportslglobal/2003/infdicator/indic 1261 1.html (last
visited Apr. 5, 2006).
54. See, e.g., TAY-SHENG WANG, LEGAL REFORM IN TAIWAN UNDER JAPANESE COLO-
NIAL RULE, 1895-1945: THE RECEPTION OF WESTERN LAW (2000).
55. Compare, e.g., comments by international NGOs opposed to the Chinese project,
such as the International Rivers Network, at http://www.irn.org/programs/threeg (last visited
Feb. 11, 2006) with DAVID E. APTER & NAGAYO SAWA, AGAINST THE STATE: POLITICS AND
PROTEST IN JAPAN (1984) (discussing studies of the Japanese experience at Narita).
56. See, e.g., THOMAS A. METZGER, THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY IN
THE CONTEXT OF CHINESE HISTORY (1998); Guy, supra note 29.
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